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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
that it must be controlled to make federal regulation effective. 3 1 The
language of the court indicates that all legal tests have been aban-
doned in favor of a purely economic test for determination of the
extent of federal authority in this field.3 2 However, in practical ef-
fect, the decision seems merely to further define the term "substantial
effect" now used by the Court as a legal test.
Apparently Congress may now regulate any intrastate activity
which "substantially affects" interstate commerce, and that "substan-
tial effect" may be merely the economic impact of some intrastate
activity, regardless of its source or its relation to interstate commerce.3 3
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
MILITARY TRIAL OF SABOTEURS
Seven men, allegedly sent to the United States by the German
Reich to sabotage war industries, landed within an American defense
zone, proceeded ashore and buried their uniforms and equipment.
Several days later they were captured and held in custody by the
Provost Marshal of the Military District of Washington for trial
before a Military Commission created by the President, on charges
of violation of the law of war, certain Articles of War, and con-
spiracy. Applications for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus
were presented in their behalf to the Federal District Court and
upon denial, appeals were perfected to the United States Supreme
Court. Held, that the charge alleged an offense which the President
was authorized to order tried by a military commission, that the com-
mission was lawfully constituted, and that the accused were not entitled
to trial by jury in the civil courts. United States ex rel, Quirin v. Cox,
317 U.S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942).
The important question to be determined is the status of the
petitioners, that is, whether they are lawful combatants or unlawful
combatants.
The right of the President as President and Commander-in-chief
of the Army and Navy, under the Constitution and Articles of War,
31. "Consumption (of wheat) on the farm where grown appears to
vary in an amount greater than 20 per cent of average produc-
tion." . . . "It can hardly be denied that a factor of such volume
and variability . . . would have a substantial influence on
price and market conditions." Instant case 63 Sup. Ct. at 90, 91.
32. Instant case, 63 Sup. Ct. at 88.
33. It is apparent that this shift from the "direct effect" test to a
test of "substantial effect" which may be merely economic leaves
the Supreme Court with greater discretionary powers than here-
tofore exercised by that judiciary. Interestingly enough some of
the members of the Supreme Court have evidenced a fear that
such a broad interpretation of the commerce clause would result
in a breakdown of our federal system of government. See Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader et al., 310 U.S. 469, 513 (1940); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295 (1936); U.S. v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 75 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495,
546 (1935) ; Hammer v. Dagenhart et al., 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918);
U.S. v. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 15 (1895). See National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 95,
96 (1937) (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 18
NOTES AND COMMENTS
to appoint a military commission to try enemy belligerents for offenses
against the law of war and Articles of War is evident unless prevented
by provisions of the Constitution relating to trial by jury. U.S. Const.
Art. I, §8, cis. 1, 10-14, 18; Art. II, §1, cl. 1, §3; 41 Stat. 787-812
(1920), 10 U.S.C. §§1471-1593 (1940).
The law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces
and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations, and between
lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are those who,
wearing the insignia of their country, wage war in the open. An-
nex to Hague Convention, ratified by the U.S. Senate, 36 Stat. 2295
(1909); 2 Oppenheim, International Law (6th ed. 1940) §107. Un-
lawful combatants are those who, without uniform, secretly pass
through the lines of the enemy for the purpose of destruction of
life and property, and gathering military information. Unlawful
combatants are generally held not to be entitled to the status of
prisoners of war, but are triable by a military comanission. 41 Stat.
789 (1920), 10 U.S.C. §1483 (Articles of War, 1940); Great Britain
War Office, Manual of Military Law (1929) §445; 2 Oppenheim,
International Law (6th ed. 1940) §255. Petitioners, under the un-
disputed facts, clearly come within the definition of unlawful com-
batants, and are to be treated and dealt with as such.
Our Constitution and statutes are very liberal in guaranteeing
trial by jury to persons charged with offenses, and the petitioners
sought to take advantage of this fact. Their rights in this respect
are to be determined by the construction to be given certain constitu-
tional provisions, particularly Art. III, §2, and the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. It was not the purpose or effect of Art. III, § 2 to en-
large the then existing right to trial by jury. The object was to pre-
serve unimpaired trial by jury in all those cases in which it had
been recognized by the common law and in all cases of a like nature
as they might arise in the future. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282
U.S. 63 (1930); Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 (1921). The Fifth
and Sixth Amendments guaranteed the continuance of certain instances
of trial by jury, but did not enlarge the right guaranteed by Art. In,
§2. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888). At the time of the adop-
tion of these provisions, military tribunals were recognized and persons
charged with violation of the law of war were tried thereby and with-
out a jury. The trial of Major John Andr6 by a military commission
appointed by General Washington is an example. Van Doren, Secret
History of the American Revolution (1st ed. 1941) 355-358; Sargent,
Life and Career of Major Andr6 (1st ed. 1861) 347-356.
In the instant case the petitioners were not entitled to a trial by
jury; they were, therefore, properly tried before a mlitary commission.
CONTRACTS
AGREEMENTS TO REPURCHASE
The plaintiffs purchased at par value six shares of preferred
stock in a lumber company. Contemporaneous with the purchase, an
agreement was signed in which defendants agreed to repurchase the
stock at par value plus any earned and unpaid dividends, "at any
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